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Abstract: A common interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity in the federalism literature is 
that decentralized government, which is closer to the people, is better able to respond to the 
preferences of its citizens. However, when the principle is denuded of its moral foundations in 
this fashion it not only fails to provide the grounding for achieving human dignity and the 
common good, but may also become the harbinger of fiscal crises and social dysfunction. We 
provide a more comprehensive account of the principle of subsidiarity and contrast this with 
various conceptions prominently presented in the federalism literature. We then explore how this 
more comprehensive view of subsidiarity would look in practice. In short, we argue that mere 
decentralization of government fails to capture the ontology and desirable outcomes of the 







Various interpretations of subsidiarity are invoked in the federalism literature. For instance, 
Boadway and Shah (2009, 245) define subsidiarity as the principle that “taxing, spending and 
regulatory functions should be exercised by lower levels of government unless a convincing case 
can be made for assigning them to higher levels of government.” Another luminary of the federal 
scholarly community, Wallace Oates (1999, 1122) defines subsidiarity as the “precept … that 
public policy and its implementation should be assigned to the lowest level of government with 
the capacity to achieve the objectives.” Moreover, Oates (1999, 1122) seeks to justify this 
interpretation of subsidiarity as decentralization by noting that “its intellectual roots, 
interestingly, are found in twentieth-century Catholic social philosophy.” In point of fact, Oates’s 
(1999) interpretation is quite discordant from Catholic social philosophy – a philosophy which 
may have its modern origins in Rerum Novarum (Leo XIII 1891), but can trace its history back to 
at least the metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century). 
Subsidiarity has its roots in the Catholic Natural Law tradition, which asserts that there are 
universally evident and universally binding existential ends for people which can be discerned by 
reason, the order of nature, and the ordinance of G-d (Messner 1952; Velasquez and Brady 1997; 
Hittinger 2003). It acknowledges that people are ruled by the same impulses which affect other 
animals – for instance, the instincts for procreation and survival – but asserts that we alone are 
conscious of the impulse, and the connection to inherent ends (Novak 1994). As such, the “end 
occupies a central position in natural law ethics” (Messner 1952, 52). The precise specification 
of the existential ends of persons is a matter of some discordance; however, Aquinas nominated 
“human life, the union of male and female, care of one’s children, a well ordered society, and 
knowledge particularly knowledge of G-d” (Velasquez and Brady 1997, 87; see also the 




person acting alone – for instance, the preservation of human life – but equally some of the 
existential ends require associations of various types (for example, the family for procreation and 
care of offspring; Kenney 1955). Thus, it would seem from the observation of nature and reason 
that a plurality of human associations are required for human flourishing (Chaplin 2014). 
The major contribution of the principle of subsidiarity is to assert that there is a proper 
assignment of functions to social structures required for persons to achieve their existential ends, 
both individually and in association. It is thus especially useful for addressing fiscal issues, not 
the whole question of authority. Moreover, Catholic social teaching asserts that “concern is one 
of propriety, which suggests that certain powers and responsibilities properly belong to various 
actors in society, prior to and apart from the consequences that may be generated” (Golemboski, 
2015, 535). This should not be interpreted as suggesting that we have no business in assessing 
the consequences of subsidiarity; indeed, consonant with Messner (1952), Sirico (1997), Novak 
(1999), and the various Magisterial statements we spend some time in explicating on the positive 
outcomes arising from a right assignment of functions. Rather, it is a statement that the principle 
of subsidiarity does not depend on its outcomes for its justification. Instead, the principle focuses 
on two key concepts within an ontology of plural social forms, namely human dignity and the 
common good (Messner 1952). Human dignity is the recognition of a person’s inherent right to 
pursue their existential ends as evident in Natural Law (Beckley 1991). The common good, on 
the other hand, is the “help accruing to the members of society in fulfilment of their ends, as the 
result of their cooperation” (Messner 1952, 118). Subsidiarity seeks to protect human dignity 
whilst recognizing the need to balance the common good within a context of plural social forms 




At this point in our exposition of subsidiarity it is almost incumbent upon us to quote at 
length the first use of the neologism articulated by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931, 
paragraph 80): 
As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account of changed conditions many 
things which were done by small associations in former times cannot be done now 
save by large associations. Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set 
aside or changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is 
gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own 
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at 
the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and 
higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do. For every social 
activity out of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and 
never destroy and absorb them. 
Notably, the “Church proposes subsidiarity, then, not as a ‘policy’ or as a mere political 
preference, but instead as one among the unchangeable ontological principles of the socio-
political order” (Brennan 2014, 31). Moreover, the articulation of Pope Pius XI was no one-off 
assertion, but has been reaffirmed by Pope John XXIII (Mater et Magistra 1961), Pope John 
Paul II (Centesimus Annus 1991), the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (2004), and Pope 
Benedict XVI (Deus Caritas Est 2005).  
It ought to be recognized as well that it would be quite wrong to consider subsidiarity 
merely as an ornament of the Church, and thus relegate a comprehensive articulation of the 
principle to the domain of Christian theologians. For instance, Eisenhower’s (1955) State of the 




The aspirations of most of our people can best be fulfilled through their own 
enterprise and initiative, without government interference. The Administration 
follows two simple rules: first, the Federal Government should perform an essential 
task only when it cannot otherwise be adequately performed: and second, in 
performing that task, our Government must not impair the self-respect, the freedom 
and the incentive of the individual … Government can fully meet its obligations 
without creating a dependent population or a domineering bureaucracy. 
We are by no means suggesting that it is only in subsidiarity that profound defenses of the 
institutions of civil society, or “intermediary bodies,” reside. For instance, in his discussion of 
the political theory of local government Wickwar (1970, 6–7) reminds us that the theory of 
sovereignty as articulated by Bodin (1606) was replete with a defense of said bodies; that 
Montesquieu (1749) made the same point,2 and that “the self-governing community” is a 
cherished element of the reaction to the Enlightenment represented in idealism and its later 
manifestations, including traditions of municipal socialism (Wickwar 1970, 30–59) and, we 
would add, discussions of civil society (see, for example, Seligman 1992; Hyden 1997). Indeed, 
a broad church of contemporary writers emphasize the same general point (see, for example, 
Oakeshott 1975; Gray 1996). However, it is with the principal of subsidiarity with which we are 
concerned and in this regard our explication agrees with that of Golemboski (2015, 546), 
wherein “the various political principles described by ‘subsidiarity’ are not [mere] friendly 
variations on a theme but rather entail fundamentally incompatible understanding of social and 
political life.” However, we go one step further, by arguing that common interpretations of 
subsidiarity in the federalism literature are in fact quite misleading misrepresentations which 




government. Extant representations of subsidiarity in the federalism literature focus on a 
trickling down of responsibilities from central government to decentralized governments in an 
apparent obsession with the geographic proximity and scale of various tiers of government. By 
way of contrast, a comprehensive view of subsidiarity, which truly has its intellectual roots in 
Catholic social philosophy, will assert a social ontology of plural social forms and be 
preoccupied with human dignity and the common good.  
In the next section we build a more comprehensive understanding of the principle of 
subsidiarity, one which is responsive to Catholic social teaching (albeit with a conservative 
interpretation of same). This is followed by a closer look at the dangers inherent in government-
centric (ontologically thin) interpretations which dominate the extant federalism literature. 
However, we realize that pointing out the differences between competing conceptions is of little 
practical import. Thus, in the penultimate section of the paper we paint a picture of what a 
comprehensive understanding of the principle of subsidiarity would actually look like when 
applied to decentralized government (it might be noted that because our focus rests on local 
government, particularly in the context of the Antipodes, we do not consider functions such as 
welfare, which are generally the responsibility of higher tiers of government). Our paper ends 
with a plea for a firm distinction between the (moral) principle of subsidiarity and (what we 
would term) the principle of decentralization, along with a recognition of some of the benefits of 
countenancing the former over the latter. 
 
A MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTION OF SUBSIDIARITY 
The etymology of the term ‘subsidiarity’ is instructive for an understanding of the principle, 




commonly invoked etymology asserts that “subsidiarity” is derived from the Latin subsidium 
which was used to describe reserve units in Roman military campaigns. As such, the term 
conveys more than the common English translation of “help” or “assistance.” Thus, Messner 
(1952) draws on the etymology to assert that subsidium is perhaps better defined as temporary 
assistance which is provided only in times of bona fide need, and then in a manner designed to 
make it superfluous as quickly as possible. Vischer (2001, 103), by way of contrast, invokes an 
etymology which suggests that subsidiarity means “to ‘seat’ (sid) a service down (sub) as close 
to the need for that service as is feasible.” Behr (2003, 105), however, draws on the Latin sub 
sudeo and the concept of Roman auxiliary troops to suggest that the term connotes a meaning of 
“‘help’ … from the bottom up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating groups all 
participate in achieving the common good of the more perfect association.” The three 
etymologies emphasize different aspects of the principle of subsidiarity – which reflect the 
different perspectives of authors in the extant literature.  
Our emphasis in the following discussion of the principle and its application to 
decentralized government is firmly on the need to balance human dignity and the common good 
in a context of plural social forms. In so doing we recognize that human dignity is an inherent 
right, but also (drawing heavily on the conservative interpretations of Sirico 1997; 2014; Novak 
1994; 1999; Kenney 1955; and Neuhaus 1999) a right which must be understood in terms of 
“what Pope John Paul II has come to call the ‘subjectivity’ of the human person; that is, the very 
core of personal responsibility, on which human dignity is grounded” (Novak 1994, 27). Such an 
interpretation emphasizes that the person is responsible for achieving those existential ends 
which can be met alone and also contributing to the common good, which provides help to the 




To balance human dignity and the common good the principle of subsidiarity employs both 
negative and positive obligations. Negatively, subsidiarity is “a principle of nonabsorption” 
which respects the person’s and persons in association’s right to pursue their inherent ends 
without interference (Chaplin 2014, 72). Positively, the principle prescribes that “all societies of 
a superior order must adopt attitudes of help (subsidium) – therefore of support, promotion, 
development – with respect to lower order societies” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 
2004, paragraphs 185–86). Thus, the positive obligation directs us to go beyond merely 
preserving pre-existing plural forms necessary for human flourishing, but also to provide 
subsidium when lesser associations become unable to perform their function for the common 
good and to assist in the development of new lesser associations should it be necessary for the 
common good. Moreover, we must remain cognizant of the nature of subsidium – evident in both 
etymology and the requirement to preserve the plurality of society – that it be delivered as 
temporary assistance in a manner designed to make it superfluous as quickly as possible 
(Messner 1952).  
As we have noted, the discussion of the principle of subsidiarity in the federalism literature 
focuses on decentralization of government. It is therefore a salient and legitimate avenue for us 
to examine. The role of government is dictated by the common good and indeed “the political 
community exists consequently for the sake of the common good in which it finds its full 
justification and significance and the source of its inherent legitimacy” (Paul VI 1965, paragraph 
74; see also John Paul II 1991, paragraph 11: “the State has a duty to watch over the common 
good … the State exists in order to protect their rights and not stifle them [the person, the family 
and society]”). That is, we posit a limited role for government according to the observation that 




legitimacy (for to do so necessarily erodes its legitimacy in addition to violating pre-existing 
plurality and potentially impinging on the dignity of the individual; Messner 1952). Otherwise 
stated, it is not in the nature of associations to destroy the very source of their legitimacy: For 
instance, a church does not seek to dissuade its adherents from a belief in G-d, nor does a family 
ordinarily seek to destroy its offspring. Moreover, the fact that individuals, families, and other 
associations are prior to the political community (not just historically, but also in an “immediate 
and irreplaceable instantiation of basic human goods”) suggests that there is no reason in nature 
to presume anything other than an instrumental role for government (Finnis 1998, 191). Indeed, 
Finnis (2013, 156) notes that proof of the instrumental nature of the State can also be had by 
asking the “State’s government and the law to prove that its jurisdiction rightly reaches so far 
into the lives of those persons and associations whose good is more intrinsic than its”. 
Thus, government should be “as big as it needs to be to fulfil its mandate; but no bigger” 
(Chaplin 2014, 74).  
To facilitate the co-operation of persons and lesser associations in pursuit of their 
existential ends, government has a clear role in creating the economic, legal, and physical 
infrastructure required. This role is in addition to creating the existential space for individuals 
and lesser associations in the event that government has previously taken action to occupy the 
space and remedying deficiencies of lesser associations – such as ensuring a minimum wage and 
implementing anti-trust legislation. In this way government can ensure the rights and obligations 
of the lesser associations and provide subsidium where there is a bona fide need (Messner 1952; 
Vischer 2001; Chaplin 2014). Notably, this includes the role of “guard[ing] against free markets 
own tendency to erode these social institutions [lesser associations]” (Vischer 2001, 119). 




taxes but also “the limit of the State’s right” (Messner 1952, 634). That is, government has a 
right to levy sufficient taxes required to fulfil its mandate – but not the right to levy taxes to 
provide goods and services which are the proper role of persons and lesser associations.  
It seems that one of the main motivations for the annunciation of subsidiary in 
Quadragesimo Anno was the fear that “following upon the overthrow and near extinction of that 
rich social life which was once highly developed through associations of various kinds, there 
remain virtually only individuals and the State” (Pius XI 1931, paragraph 78). Pope Pius XI 
appealed to the self-interest of the State in providing a reason for why a society comprising only 
government and persons was not desirable, namely that such a situation would be of “great harm 
[to] the State itself; for, with a structure of social governance lost, and with the taking over of all 
the burdens which the wrecked associations once bore, the State has been overwhelmed and 
crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties” (Pius XI 1931, paragraph 78). Recent sovereign 
crises in a number of countries would certainly seem to support the contention of Pius XI (1931).  
However, a number of other reasons have since been advanced for why we should prefer a 
plural society. Neuhaus and Berger coined the term “mediating structures” to put forward an 
argument regarding the importance of “institutions standing between the individual in his (sic) 
private life and the large institutions of public life” (cited in Vischer 2001, 116). The argument is 
that mediating institutions (which include families, neighborhoods, churches, and voluntary 
associations) are critical in transmitting values, providing meaning, and reducing the potential for 
alienation (Neuhaus 1999; Vischer 2001). We recognize that mediating structures are put 
forward as an argument against megastructures (which include government, but also large 
corporations and other powerful institutions (such as trade unions)) and the private sphere. 




reduced to just the State and persons would in fact represent a greater gulf between the public 
and private spheres. In addition, Fort (1999, 395) notes the salience of size – “because of their 
small size mediating institutions allow individuals to see and experience the consequences of 
their actions.” That is, in a small association persons can see how their co-operation promotes the 
common good and, in so doing, in turn assists the person to achieve their own existential ends.  
Another important reason for preferring plural forms is found in the observation that there 
is “intrinsic value [in the] collaborative activity” itself (Hittinger 2003, 279). Thus, in addition to 
the tangible good produced when persons come together to pursue an end, we have the good of 
collaboration itself (think, for example of the collaborative good generated when a person strives 
as part of a team in the workplace). If society were to be composed of just the State and the 
person then it is hard to see how the collaborative good might be experienced.  
A fourth argument against a society reduced to just the State and persons is the potential 
for such an arrangement to foster a state of dependency. Returning to the Natural Law roots of 
subsidiarity we are reminded of the fact that only some of a person’s existential ends can be 
realized alone. If there were no other associations then persons would have no option other than 
to depend on the State for certain ends. Moreover, because of a “moral weakness [from which] 
none of us are exempt” we might expect that persons will also fall to the temptation of looking to 
the State for ends properly satisfied by themselves (Novak 1994, 27). A state of dependency is 
not a state of human dignity and does not create the conditions necessary for personal growth 
(Kenney 1955; Sirico 1997).  
A fifth objection to society comprising just the State and persons is the absence of moral 
proximity in such an arrangement. Moral proximity implies “accountability,” “transparency,” 




needs: namely, loving personal concern” (Benedict XVI 2005, paragraph 28(b)). Further, “this 
love does not simply offer people material help, but refreshment and care for their souls, 
something which often is more necessary than material support” (emphasis added; Benedict 
XVI 2005, paragraph 28(b)). Bureaucracies generally seem incapable of gaining the intimate 
knowledge of the person and the person’s problems which is required for effective intervention. 
Moreover, it is those in the closest contact with the person who have the greatest stake in 
ensuring the success of any intervention (Sirico 1997). A remote State simply handing out a 
fixed quantum of money – without examining the circumstances of the person – may perversely 
enable destructive behaviors (for instance, by providing the financial means to continue to 
consume harmful drugs or drink to excess) or fail to support the person to grow (perhaps 
additional funds are called for to pay for vocational training, counseling, education, or other 
necessary items so that the person can more fully contribute to the common good). Indeed, 
Novak (1994, 27) claims that the welfare state “has deliberately been constructed to be amoral … 
that it neither demands nor rewards responsible behaviour … pays equal benefits to those who 
spurn virtue…[and] subsidises irresponsibility.” Whilst many would recoil from his conclusions, 
it is certainly the case that the State tends to treat all needy persons alike (according to 
administrative expediency and equity considerations), despite the fact that each person has 
different needs, responds to different incentives, and is at a different stage in achieving their 
existential ends. It is a “mistaken notion that man (sic) can ‘live by bread alone’ – a conviction 
that demeans man and ultimately disregards all that is specifically human” (Benedict XVI 2005, 
paragraph 28(b)). Only close contact, mentoring, and an acknowledgement of reciprocal 




organizations have long employed these practices, which government bureaucracies have 
shunned (generally because of political considerations) (Sirico 1997).  
A sixth objection to reducing society to just the State and the person is the apparent inertia 
of bureaucracies which prevents them from responding to the spontaneous possibilities visible to 
lesser associations (Benedict XVI 2005). Moreover, there is a question of competency (Finnis 
1998) – in many cases government is not the most competent entity to achieve a desired outcome 
(as testified to by the literature on government failure – see, for example, Wallis and Dollery 
1999). 
To understand the objections against reducing society to just the State and persons it is 
instructive to consider a fundamental form of association – the family. The family is a critical 
mediating structure for transmitting the values and culture of society to the next generation (for 
example, when some parents choose to teach their children manners). Moreover, the 
transparency afforded by its small size allows each member to understand how their co-operation 
contributes to the common good through which some of their ends are realized (for example, 
children learn that doing chores frees up time for parents which parents can then invest in family 
activities). In addition, the family produces familial bonds of love – a collaborative good which 
would go missing if we, like the Spartans, had the State raise children or if parents sub-
contracted out the task (despite the fact that both of these approaches might be more 
“efficient”).3 Moreover, as children grow parents generally take great delight in teaching them 
the skills required to become independent. In addition, because of the moral proximity between 
parent and child when intervention is required (say in the instance of a child developing the 
“habit” of lying) this is delivered with loving concern, knowledge of the cause of the problem, 




know how much they are loved and treasured as a unique and special person, and sometimes it is 
this desire to please, more than any other factor, that propels young people to personal growth (it 
is hard to see how such a bond of love could exist between the State and a person). Moreover, 
should a need or opportunity arise for a child to develop an end parents are in a position to 
respond spontaneously (for example, a child expressing an interest in the fine arts might prompt 
the parent to take them to a local art gallery). Finally, we need only look at the disturbingly 
frequent accounts of abuses of children in State custody (relative to the number of minors in 
State custody) to perceive that a loving family is immeasurably more competent at child-rearing. 
In short, the existence of an association called “family” would seem to deliver better outcomes 
for the infant person than might be expected if there were only the State in its stead. 
In sum, subsidiarity is a social ontology predicated on a plurality of social forms which 
seeks to strike a balance between human dignity and the common good. We take the source of 
the State’s legitimacy (the common good), the need to preserve plural forms for human 
flourishing, and the need to preserve person’s dignity to posit a limited role for government. 
Moreover, through recourse to the ideas of fiscal sustainability, the importance of mediating 
structures for reconciling the private and public spheres, the intrinsic value of the collaborative 
good, the potential for introducing dependency, the need for moral proximity, and the greater 
scope for spontaneity by smaller associations, we have shown why it is undesirable to reduce 
society to just persons and the State. We now compare this more comprehensive conception of 
subsidiarity with the various interpretations of the principle found in the federalism literature. 
 




As noted in the introduction there are a number of invocations of the principle of subsidiarity to 
be found within the corpus of federalism literature. Invocations tend to be government-centric 
(built upon thin ontological foundations), although the various interpretations are nuanced 
according to their emphases on legal, economic, political, or effectiveness considerations. For 
instance, Twomey and Withers (2007, 6), writing for the Council for the Australian Federation, 
assert that “the principle of subsidiarity … states that matters should be dealt with by the lowest 
level of government practicable.” Moreover, the authors point to legal barriers (specifically the 
Constitution of Australia, which does not recognize local government) and economic arguments 
(in particular spill-over effects, fiscal capacity, and economies of scale) to argue against 
devolving further functions to local government. Similarly, Deem, Hollander, and Brown (2015, 
421) have argued that “subsidiarity is commonly understood as a decentralist principle that 
proposes that the functions of government should be performed as close to the people as 
practical” and that “although the most appropriate definition remains open to debate and 
deserves further research, for the present purposes we adopt the predominantly decentralist 
definition of subsidiarity as it is generally understood in Australian academic and public policy 
literature.” Moreover, an argument has been advanced that the political preferences of citizens 
are consistent with further decentralization of government (predicated largely on effectiveness 
considerations), but that political culture may not be compatible with same (Brown 2002). 
All of the aforementioned literature presents subsidiarity as “a trickling down of power or 
aid” (Hittinger, cited in Brennan 2014, 34). Yet within Catholic social teaching subsidiarity is 
not about indulging lesser governments or even lesser associations, but instead recognizing that 
the properly ordained power structure of society “is in the person and persons in community” 




earlier (Messner 1952; Sirico 1997; Novak 1999). That is, the properly ordained power structure 
resides in the dignity of the person who must form associations in order to pursue the perfections 
evident if reason is applied to the state of nature. Moreover, “contrary to much public discourse, 
subsidiarity is, in principle, no more attached to devolution … than to centralisation” 
(Golemboski 2015, 535). It is about the proper assignment of functions – whether this be higher 
or lower. As the Reverend Robert Sirico (1997) astutely notes, there is absolutely nothing to be 
gained by replacing an intrusive central government with a collection of intrusive decentralized 
governments. In fact, we would contend that there is a distinct danger in doing so because “local 
governments … closer to their constituencies … have superior knowledge of the preferences or 
demands of local residents” (Oates 2005, 353). That is, a cohort of decentralized governments in 
closer geographic proximity to their constituents will likely hear more demands and –if 
predisposed to believe that government rather than persons and associations should meet 
demands – will likely become larger in scope than a comparative central government. Otherwise 
stated, what is for Oates (1999), Brown (2002), and others an advantage of decentralized 
government – its closer proximity to the people – could also represent a threat to the financial 
sustainability of local governments if the closer geographic proximity results in hearing and 
responding to more needs and demands for services which are not matched by higher revenues 
(see our discussion on expenditure growth and taxation limitations below). 
Another area in which a thin ontological interpretation of subsidiarity represents a danger 
not found under more comprehensive conceptions of the principle might be found in the 
propensity for public budgets to be converted into political capital (see, for instance, the seminal 
work of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981 on political capitalization of public budgets; 




monopolistic powers to maximize budgets; Friedman 1993 on the vested interest within 
government for continuing ineffective services, or the more recent work of Drew and Dollery 
2017 on political capitalization of public budgets in Australian decentralized government). As 
long as the focus of subsidiarity is (erroneously) placed on the meeting of citizen demands by 
government there is the potential for politically opportunistic behavior to put upwards pressure 
on public budgets (“according to [a] re-election mechanism, [by which] voter decisions 
correspond to a ‘what have you done for me lately?’ evaluation”; Weingast, Shepsle, and 
Johnsen 1981, 652). This is perhaps even more likely in a decentralized system of government, 
because probability alone suggests that fewer persons need to be indulged in order to effect 
political outcomes in smaller electorates (Feld 2014). 
However, perhaps the greatest danger inherent in a thin ontological interpretation of 
subsidiarity (removed from the moral force of Catholic social teaching) relates to the potential 
for a learned helplessness within a society conditioned to believe that the government has a 
rightful role in wholly performing tasks which could be accomplished by persons or persons in 
their associations (Novak 1994; Sirico 2014). It is found in the breakdown of social structures, 
such as the family, benevolent foundations, and clubs, which leads to a concomitant diminution 
in social cohesion (Beabout 1998; Fergusson 2013). It is also evident in the inability of 
government to know all and be all to the many cultures, religions, and world-views making up a 
society (Sirico 1997).  
We now outline some of the major steps involved in implementing a more comprehensive 
conception of the principle of subsidiarity at a local government level. Clearly we are not able to 
specify an entire manifesto for the introduction of subsidiarity at the sub-national level within the 




demonstrate how a “subsidiarity local government” would differ from the version of local 
government promoted by thin ontological interpretations of the principle. In so doing, we hope to 
highlight the enhanced state of dignity, social cohesion, and fiscal sustainability which might 
result if political actors were to set aside some of their short-term ambitions and misconceptions 
of the justification and source of legitimacy of the State (Messner 1952; Paul VI 1965; Sirico 
1997; Novak 1999). 
 
IMPLEMENTING SUBSIDIARITY IN PRACTICE 
The scholarly literature has many examples of fiscal crises in local government, and the various 
interventions made to offer redress (see, for example, Andrews 2013 on the regulatory response 
to fiscal distress in England and Wales; Scorsone and Padovani 2014 on the debt crisis 
[including multiple municipal bankruptcies] in local government in the United States of 
America; Li and Yang 2015 on the sub-national debt crisis in China; and Drew and Campbell 
2016 on local government insolvency in Australia). Part of the reason for these local government 
financial crises may be found in expanding public budgets (although this is by no means the 
entire explanation). Table 1 provides details of two complementary measures of local 
government spending (for large OECD nations for which there are consecutive records): 
spending as a proportion of total government expenditure; and average annual growth in local 
government nominal expenditure. Except for three instances, the proportion of government 
spending by local governments has increased over the relevant period (moreover, this reflects a 
trend in relative budget expansion) and in all cases the average annual growth rate in local 
government expenditure has exceeded the average annual inflation rate for the respective period. 




responsibilities between tiers of government (including the case where inappropriate assignment 
of responsibilities has been redressed), the corporatization of previous government functions, and 
the effects of fiscal austerity. Therefore, whilst the evidence is compelling, it is not conclusive. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
It could be countered that such expansion of local government expenditures need not threaten 
local government financial sustainability in any way, given that government can fund as much 
activity and subsidy as it likes, so long as the public is willing to pay the requisite taxes. There 
are two principal reasons for disputing this assertion regarding the financial sustainability of 
local government. First, the evidence of multiple local government bankruptcies and insolvencies 
suggests that a number of local governments have failed to be able to “fund as much activity as 
they like.” Second, there is some reason to believe that the public is not willing to pay (or does 
not have the capacity to pay) the requisite levels of taxation. For instance, in Australia populist 
support for long-standing local government taxation limitations in the largest state of New South 
Wales remains strong, whilst one other state (Victoria) has recently introduced local government 
taxation limitations, and South Australia and Western Australia are mooted to soon introduce 
taxation limitations (ABC News 2015; Drew and Dollery 2016). Moreover, this reflects the 
experience abroad, for instance in North America (see, for example, Taylor 2014).  
We believe that a studious adoption of the principle of subsidiarity could provide part of 
the solution for those jurisdictions facing local government financial sustainability crises 
(although we reiterate that the justification for the principle of subsidiarity does not depend on 




cohesive society where the dignity of the person is respected and promoted (Bezovan, 
Matancevic, and Baturina 2016). It should not be inferred that the remedies apply only to local 
government; indeed, a careful application of subsidiarity would go a long way towards 
addressing some sovereign political and financial crises; however, in a single journal article of 
this type it would not be possible to do justice to all tiers of government. Moreover, as we note 
above, the damage of thin ontological interpretations might be expected to be most keenly felt at 
the subnational level. 
Messner’s (1952) seminal work on Natural Law provides us with a template for 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity at a local government level. Specifically, Messner 
(1952, 197) outlines a “threefold duty with corresponding rights:” (i) “the creation of the 
conditions necessary for the independent activity of the lesser communities for the attainment of 
their inherent ends,” (ii) “the declaration and definition by law of the rights and obligations of 
the lesser communities,” and (iii) “fulfilment of the tasks of the lesser communities … when and 
so far as these are unable to fulfil them.” The first “duty” described by Messner (1952) relates to 
the need to promote and create the existential space for the operation of lesser associations. In a 
society where government has taken on many of the functions which were once provided by 
lesser associations, this duty necessarily involves divestment of some extant local government 
services and support (Zimmermann 2015). The second duty reflects the need to provide 
legislative protection for lesser associations and, if necessary, legislate for the establishment of 
important associations. Messner’s (1952) final duty refers to the need for superior orders to 
provide subsidium when lower orders are unable to carry out tasks required for the common 
good – but, as noted earlier, strictly in a manner which makes the assistance superfluous as 




Readers should remain cognizant that the following discussion is orientated towards local 
government (and that the authors write from the perspective of the Antipodes, where local 
government has a rather limited remit focusing largely on roads, the arts, recreation, and waste 
removal). Therefore, many of the essential functions of government which are generally assigned 
to higher tiers of government (such as anti-trust legislation, welfare, and the like) are not 
considered here. Moreover, where local government does fulfil a broader remit the principles 
remain unchanged (although the details will clearly differ according to the specific circumstances 
of the jurisdiction). A case in point is the provision of education, which occurs at a local 
government level in the northern hemisphere. Education is generally offered according to either 
full or partial public funding. Where persons do not have the capacity to pay full fees, there is 
clearly a case for funding, given that an educated person can more fully contribute to the 
common good. However, parents have the right to establish their own institutions for education – 
human dignity concerns would seem to argue against a State monopoly on education – and to 
receive a subsidy no higher than the full cost of publicly funded education, if they choose to do 
so (see Messner 1952, 602). Moreover, the idea of personal responsibility and the common good 
would suggest that subsidies should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the person or 
their caregivers, rather than being applied in a blanket fashion irrespective of need (see our 
discussion on local government taxation relief and co-production). Other institutions, however – 
such as police services (which also are not a function of local government in the Antipodes) – 
need to be funded on an ongoing basis out of taxation revenues, because they represent an 
essential service towards the common good, which is of the nature of a public good. In sum, the 
principles of human dignity and common good are to be applied to all cases of associations and 




the assignment of functions within federations (of which there are so many permutations that 
space does not allow us to specify each). 
The first duty of the greater communities (in Messner’s terms, synonymous with the State) 
is the area requiring the most attention by local governments wishing to embrace a 
comprehensive conception of subsidiarity. In particular, it is necessary for local governments to 
review all existing functions with the objective of divesting services which have previously been 
provided by associations, or could be provided by associations. This is clearly a necessary step 
towards creating the space for lesser associations to operate. At the same time, local governments 
must actively promote the formation of associations and provide support – whether financial or 
purely facilitative – in a manner consistent with the concept of subsidium. It is important to stress 
that divestment must be accompanied by active promotion and subsidium for lesser associations 
– subsidiarity is not about vacating important social endeavors; rather, it is about fostering the 
formation of associations which are in the best position to provide for the common good in a 
manner which emphasizes dignity (Sirico 1997). Every step must be taken to ensure that there is 
no diminution in the common good as a result of divestment (moreover, it may be necessary to 
defer divestment until such time as lesser associations have been promoted and developed to an 
adequate level of capacity).  
In similar vein, it is important for local governments to review the level of financial 
assistance and subsidies provided to existing special-interest groups and persons, with a view to 
reducing the assistance whenever circumstances allow, or when it is unhelpful for the dignity of 
the person or association. An important part of this process will involve communicating to 
special-interest groups and private beneficiaries the need to promote dignity and adjust what are 




decades ago, the problem with government is that “once the activity begins, whether it proves 
desirable or not, people in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested interest in 
it … if the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong incentive to 
find another justification for its continued existence.” Otherwise stated, unless there is some 
process of review leading to reduction and divestment, the size of government must inevitably 
grow and grow (Kenney 1955; Friedman 1993). If revenues do not keep apace – and the taxation 
limitation literature seems to suggest that it often will not – then financial sustainability will 
falter (and an unjust impost may be placed on future generations via debt). Even if revenues do 
keep up with expanding budgets we have a problem: the wider body of taxpayers (which we 
concede may sometimes also include recipients) are being imposed upon to fund a climate of 
dependency, which the principle of subsidiarity suggests will rob persons of their dignity.  
In this regard, it is a curious fact that neither taxpayers nor the recipients of subsidium are 
generally aware of the level of assistance which they contribute or receive. Certainly most 
taxpayers know their total tax impost – but few are aware of precisely how much goes towards 
paying for assistance to associations and persons. This failure to make the taxpayer-recipient 
relationship transparent and accountable not only ignores the dignity of each party, but also fails 
to set up conditions of moral proximity. That is, without indicating to the recipient that taxpayers 
have been imposed upon in order for them to receive the benefit, it is difficult to see how the 
recipient might feel morally accountable towards taxpayers. This is not about humiliation – “any 
humiliation is caused by the circumstances not the benefactor” – but rather respecting the rights 
of the wider body of taxpayers, ensuring recipients understand the value of goods and services in 
the absence of price signals and fostering reciprocal responsibility (Sirico 1997, 572). Moreover, 




assistance, they will hardly be in the position to lobby for changes to the status quo. Thus, one 
method of providing some balance to the inevitable protests by recipients and providers of 
assistance which is tapered off would be to provide the wider body of taxpayers with some 
information regarding how much they are being imposed upon for the respective benefit. 
However, merely creating space through divestment, actively promoting the formation of 
associations to conduct the functions vacated, and reducing the extant state of dependency of 
persons and associations does not fulfil the “first duty” of local government. It is also important 
for local government to actively encourage the formation of associations to satisfy needs which 
are currently unmet – whether they be in the field of social, cultural, recreational, or political 
expression. The democratic process gives greatest weight to majority views; therefore, without 
associations to enhance the audibility of minority positions to the political elite, social 
dysfunction may emerge. One particularly topical example of this in the western world can be 
found in the assertion that radicalization of Muslim youth is promoted, at least in part, by a sense 
of disconnection with both the wider community and more moderate Muslim voices 
(Akbarzadeh 2013). Promotion of Muslim youth groups, interfaith assemblies, or Islamic 
outreach events (where the wider community can come to learn of positive elements from 
Islamic culture) could perhaps provide important mediating structures which might reduce 
alienation and assist in transmitting cultural values, and hence provide part of the solution to a 
very pressing problem. Thus, adoption of the principle of subsidiarity can advance social 
cohesion. 
The “second duty” of government is to establish a legal framework for the operation of 
lesser associations. A legal framework for incorporated associations does exist in Australia and 




government function, it is important to briefly consider the matter as it is clearly a prerequisite 
for the successful execution of the first and third duties. A framework for association is 
important in order to specify the legitimate activities or objectives of the association, to establish 
associations as legal entities capable of entering into contracts, to ensure fiscal probity, and to 
manage disputes between members. The incorporation of associations also protects same against 
undue interference by government (depending on the particular legal framework of the country 
or state of incorporation). Moreover, we extend Messner’s (1952) second duty to suggest that 
there may be times when coercive legislation from higher tiers of government is required to 
“encourage” local governments “therefore of support, promotion, development – with respect to 
lower order societies” (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2004, paragraph 186). An 
example of this is the establishment of “lesser associations” to carry out the important oversight 
of local government transparency and accountability – what is referred to in Australia as external 
audit committees. For one reason or another, local governments in New South Wales, Australia 
have been reticent to initiate external audit committees, and only about half of the local 
governments have an audit committee of any form (and invariably this does not comprise 
external independent actors). By way of contrast, in the state of Victoria local governments are 
required by law to establish an independent audit committee and all local governments do so. 
Thus, it can be seen through this example that there are instances in which coercive legislation 
by higher tiers of government may be a necessary impetus for the formation of important 
associations relevant to local government. 
Messner’s (1952) “third duty” of greater communities speaks directly to how subsidium 
should be provided to lesser associations. In particular, our earlier discussion of the principle 




quickly as possible and establishing reciprocal responsibility. Before providing subsidium to a 
person or association it seems important to establish whether the assistance is indeed required, 
what efforts the person or association has made to provide for their own interests, and what plans 
the person or association has made to ensure that they might in time be able to provide for their 
own needs. There would be very few cases in which a person could not make at least some 
contribution towards the goal for which subsidium is sought. For instance, if a person required 
assistance in meeting local government taxation expenses they might suggest how much they 
could contribute (rather than be provided with a set concession irrespective of wealth, as occurs 
for pensioners in Australia), or how they intend to contribute to the local common good in other 
ways – for instance, by doing some volunteer work (perhaps volunteering to help out in a literacy 
program). In similar vein, an association seeking funding to achieve some goal might show how 
much their members have pledged to contribute towards the expense, or detail the in-kind 
support that members could provide towards achieving the outcome.  
In this regard, the use of matching grants and co-production mechanisms seems 
particularly apt. Rather than providing a set figure of assistance to an association, a local 
government can offer to match the association’s internal and external fundraising efforts up to a 
certain ceiling. This will encourage associations to exert maximum efforts towards raising their 
own funds to achieve the desired ends – including community fund-raising. This in turn 
promotes engagement between the association and the wider community. Moreover, should the 
request for subsidium be accepted then it must be remembered that the association still has its 
part to play. That is, the emphasis should be on co-production rather than having the local 
government or a sub-contractor complete the task for the association. For instance, if the funds 




and equipment on the condition that the association provides the labor. In so doing, the act of 
collaboration itself becomes a good, in addition to the original good sought (in our example, the 
painting of the community center). 
In sum, implementation of subsidiarity at the local government level involves divestment 
of extant functions, promotion of lesser associations, tapering off of financial support, 
appropriate legislative frameworks, and adherence to the principles of subsidium when 
responding to requests for assistance. Otherwise stated the implementation of subsidiarity for 
local government is about supporting the common good rather than displacing the proper role of 
persons and persons in association. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Contrary to the pervasive thin ontological interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity within 
the corpus of scholarly literature on federalism (see, for example, Oates 1999; Deem, Hollander, 
and Brown 2015), we propose a broader interpretation of the principle which emphasizes human 
dignity and the common good within a society of plural forms. In this conservative reading of the 
principle of subsidiarity, government is accorded a much more limited role which responds to its 
mandate of contributing to the common good (Messner 1952; Sirico 1997). Specifically, we 
argue that the State should not displace the ends of persons and lesser associations from which it 
derives its legitimacy (for to do so not only violates pre-existing plurality and potentially 
impinges on human dignity, but also erodes government’s very source of legitimacy). Moreover, 
we show how a conception of subsidiarity which is more responsive to Catholic social teaching 
(at least to the conservative mind) has significant benefits for persons and society – although we 




Moreover, we argue that the competing conceptions of subsidiarity are not inconsequential 
quibbles about definition, but represent completely different concepts. It is perhaps an error in 
scholarship which has gained currency simply as a result of the perceived error being reiterated 
on a regular basis by luminaries of federal scholarship. Much confusion would be avoided if this 
perceived error was corrected. Thus, we assert that the term “Principle of Subsidiarity” as it 
appears in general use within the federalism literature should instead be replaced by the term 
“Principle of Decentralization.” 
However, this admonishment should not be taken to suggest that we believe the principle 
of subsidiarity has no place at all in federalism scholarship. It may indeed be the case that “what 
the free world needs, rapidly, is a devolution of significant responsibilities from centralised 
bureaucracies to citizens, alone and in their multiple associations” (Novak 1999, 106). With the 
help of Messner’s (1952) “threefold duties” we have shown that there is a path from potentially 
unsustainable trajectories in spending and a situation of “virtually only individuals and the State” 
towards what is perhaps a more socially just, cohesive, dignifying and financially sustainable 
society (Pius XI 1931, paragraph 78). The path requires courageous community leadership and a 
setting aside of political capitalization. However, impetus for reform is apparent, given that it 
appears that we may well be approaching the eight-decade-old prediction of a future of a “social 
governance lost, and with the taking over of all the burdens which the wrecked associations once 
bore … [a] State [that] has been overwhelmed and crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties” 
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1 We acknowledge that human dignity is also invoked by those seeking to expand social 
spending (particularly welfare; see, for instance, Gundersen 2012). When used in this context the 




                                                                                                                                                                                            
2012, 378), generally in the absence of a mention of the common good or whether the assistance 
sought will foster positive development in the person (towards their existential ends) – or instead 
facilitate the destructive behaviors which may have led them to their current difficulties (Beckley 
1991; Sirico 1997). A common objection to the idea that persons should be encouraged to 
achieve their existential ends and contribute to the common good is that some persons (for 
instance, the severely disabled) are unable to participate in the workforce. We would argue that 
this is an unhelpfully narrow interpretation of both existential ends and the common good that 
focuses on a small group of exceptional persons – which clearly must be provided with the basic 
requirements for life – rather than the more representative examples of welfare recipients. 
Moreover, we note that the focus of this paper is not on welfare, but rather the implications of a 
more comprehensive conception of subsidiarity, particularly for local government. 
2 Wickwar (1970, 6–7) cites Bodin (1606) thus: “Monarchies … become corrupted when little by 
little the privileges of bodies and cities are taken away, and when, instead of limiting themselves 
to a general supervision, which alone is worthy of a sovereign, princes want to rule everything 
without an intermediary.” From Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1749) Wickwar (1970, 7) 
highlights: “It is dependent and subordinate intermediary authorities that form the essence of 
monarchy, that is to say, of a government in which one man rules according to fundamental laws 
… If, in a monarchy, you abolish the prerogatives of the lords, the clergy, the gentry and the 
cities, you will soon have a Popular State or else a Despotism.” 
3 This is an interesting example of how the market can sometimes corrode the associations 
necessary for subsidiarity to work. In the developed world it is now quite unusual for a mother to 
stay at home with non-school aged infants (40 years ago precisely the opposite was true – 




                                                                                                                                                                                            
which is certainly a more “efficient” arrangement – especially in view of government subsidies 
for child care and (what is often claimed to be) economic imperatives. Moreover, this is the sort 
of example which may have prompted Hittinger (2003, 280) to state that “it is only when we 
identify goods of common activities that we can discover a principled limit to the power of the 
state as well as to the subcontracting (or ‘outsourcing’) mentality characteristic of markets.” 
